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REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA v. WHITE: THE LIFTING OF
JUDICIAL SPEECH RESTRAINT
David B. Bogard*
"What we have here is a failure to communicate."'
I. BACKGROUND
In 1996 Gregory F. Wersal, a lawyer licensed to practice in the State of
Minnesota, decided to run for the position of Associate Justice of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court.2 In his race against an incumbent, Mr. Wersal cam-
paigned at numerous meetings of the Republican Party of Minnesota.3 As a
result, an ethical complaint was filed against Wersal with the Minnesota
Office of Lawyer's Professional Responsibility alleging, among other
things, that Wersal violated Canon 5(A)(3) of the Minnesota Canons of Ju-
dicial Conduct ("Announce Clause"), as it is applied to lawyers who are
judicial candidates through Rule 8.2(b) of the Minnesota Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.4 The Announce Clause states, in part, that "a candidate for
judicial office ... shall not ... announce his or her view on disputed legal
issues."5 Wersal's wife and brother announced that Wersal was in favor of
"a strict construction of the Constitution."6
In addition, candidate Wersal had distributed campaign literature criti-
cal of three decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court.7 The Court in 1994
ruled that an in-custody confession must be tape-recorded or it would not be
* Judge Bogard is an Arkansas native. He graduated from Southern Methodist Univer-
isty in Dallas, Texas and received his L.L.B. from the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville
in 1968. Governor Bill Clinton appointed Judge Bogard as Chancery Judge for the Third
Division in 1981. In 1983, Judge Bogard was elected as Circuit Judge for the Sixth Division
Circuit Court, where he served until he retired in January of 2003. Judge Bogard has au-
thored numerous legal seminars, including "The Trial of Fatty Arbuckle," which won na-
tional acclaim. He also produced the video "The Jury Trial as Seen Through the Eyes of
Hollywood" for the William R. Overton Inn of Court, in which Judge Bogard serves as a
charter member. Judge Bogard was named "Outstanding Circuit Judge" for three of the last
four years of his judgeship.
1 CooL HAND LUKE (Warner Bros. 1967) (quoting Strother Martin, "Captain," Road
Prison 36).
2. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 970 (D. Minn 1999)
(indicating Wersal's 1996 judicial candidacy).
3. Id. at 972.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 971-72.
6. Id. at 972.
7. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 771 (2002).
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allowed into evidence. 8 Wersal stated, "Should we conclude that because
the Supreme Court does not trust police, it allows confessed criminals to go
free?" 9 In 1993 the Court struck down, as a violation of the constitutional
right to travel, a state law that limited welfare benefits to people moving
into the state.' 0 "The Court should have deferred to the Legislature. It's the
Legislature which should set our spending policies."'" The Court, in 1994,
ruled that a woman's right to privacy under the Minnesota Constitution
meant the state must use welfare funds to pay for abortion.' 2 Wersal opined,
"[T]he idea that the State must pay for individuals to exercise their rights is
almost unprecedented."' 3 Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, noted Wersal's
comment that the Court "'abandons all vestige of neutrality' in its pro-
abortion stance."'
14
The complaint was dismissed by the Lawyer's Board, finding that his
materials did not violate Canon 5 even as it found that the provision was,
perhaps, constitutionally suspect. 15 Nevertheless, Wersal withdrew his can-
didacy fearing further complaints would jeopardize his law practice. ' 6
In 1998 Wersal once again announced his candidacy for Associate Jus-
tice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.' 7 Early on, he sought an advisory
opinion from The Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility as to
whether or not it would seek to enforce the announce clause of Canon 5 .8
The Office refused to render an opinion until Wersal provided it with exam-
ples of what he intended to say, which Wersal declined to furnish.' 9 Instead
Wersal filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
under § 1983 requesting declaratory and injunctive relief against various
provisions of Canon 5.20 The Republican Party of the State of Minnesota,
alleging it was unable to judge the qualifications of Wersal under the An-
nounce Clause, was listed, among others, as a petitioner along with Wer-
sal. 2' The District Court denied Petitioner's and granted the Respondent's
8. id.
9. Id. at 771.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 811 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
12. Id.
13. White, 536U.S. at811.
14. Id.
15. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 972-73 (D. Minn. 1999).
16. Id. at 973.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 973-74.
19. Id. at 974.
20. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2001).
21. Id.
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motion for summary judgment, finding the Announce Clause constitu-
tional .22
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
23
That court, in a 2-1 opinion affirming the district court's judgment, con-
strued the Announce Clause to preclude "candidates only from publicly
making known how they would decide issues likely to come before them as
judges. 24 The Eighth Circuit held that the Announce Clause is a narrowly
tailored limitation on campaign speech that serves a compelling state inter-
est in maintaining an "independent and impartial judiciary" and an "equally
important interest in preserving public confidence in that independence and
impartiality. 25
The Petitioners then appealed the action to the United States Supreme
Court alleging that the Announce Clause unconstitutionally restricted their
right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution.26 Certiorari was granted27 and in June of 2002, in a 5-4 decision,28
the Supreme Court reversed the findings of the Eighth Circuit. 29 Writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia ruled that the Announce Clause violated the
First Amendment and was thus unconstitutional.30 In reversing the Eighth
Circuit's ruling, the Court found that the state's interest of preserving the
impartiality of the judiciary or appearance thereof, is not compelling; fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court held that the Announce Clause was not suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored to meet those goals even if they were compelling.
3
'
Justice Scalia ruled that, "the First Amendment does not permit ... leaving
the principle of elections in place while preventing [the] candidates from
discussing what the elections are about., 32 Further, Justice Scalia opined,
"There is an obvious tension between the article of Minnesota's Constitu-
tion which provides that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's announce clause which places most subjects of interest to the
voters off limits."33
22. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 986; see also Kelly, 247 F.3d at 860-61.
23. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 861.
24. Id. at 881-82.
25. Id. at 867.
26. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 766.
29. Id. at 788.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 776.
32. White, 536 U.S. at 788.
33. Id. at 787.
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE JUDICIAL ELECTION PROCESS
The Announce Clause of Canon Five only pertains to statements made
by candidates for judicial office.34 Thus a violation of such a clause would
only occur in a state that provides for an elected judiciary. At the present
time a majority of the states, thirty-three in all, use popular elections to se-
lect or retain their judges.35 The election of judges, however, does not go
back as far as the origins of this country.3 6 Originally, the King of England
selected the judges for the colonies who served at the Crown's pleasure.37
Consequently, the Crown constantly removed judges who made decisions
frowned upon by the Crown.38 The original colonists viewed the judges of
the day not as independent arbiters of controversies but as pawns of the
English authority. 39 Indeed, the Declaration of Independence states that the
King "[h]as made judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.' 40
When the colonists gained freedom from England, all thirteen original
states similarly provided for the appointment of judges. 4' This situation led
to problems similar to those the colonists had with the Crown: appointed
judges only served the interests of the male property owners who controlled
all the appointments.42 Widespread resentment of this process led to the
Jacksonian Democracy historical movement which resulted in the popular
election of judges.43 The state of Georgia was the first to amend its constitu-
tion in 1812 to provide for the election of the inferior courts."4 By 1860,
twenty-four of the thirty-four states had elected judiciaries.45 At the present
time, thirty-three states use popular elections to select or retain their
judges.4 6
34. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 971-72 (D. Minn.
1999) (quoting the Announce Clause and its headings as applying to "[a] candidate for a
judicial office").
35. EVAN HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 101-35 (Nat'l Conf. Jud. Coun-
cils ed., 1944).
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also HARRY STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 133 (2d ed. 1998).
38. HAYNES, supra note 35, at 54-55.
39. Id. at 51-79.
40. DOCUMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA: FROM MAGNA
CARTA TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1789, at 103 (Francis Bowen ed., 1993).
41. HAYES, supra note 35, at 101-35.
42. Id. at 87-89.
43. See id. at 88-89.
44. Id. at 96.
45. See id. at 101-35.
46. Id.
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In 1857 Minnesota adopted the popular election process for its judici-
ary.47 In 1912 the Minnesota Legislature mandated non-partisan judicial
elections.48 This election of judges created a particularly difficult situation
for Minnesota and other states that elect their judiciary: The States have to
address how to isolate a judge from the rough and tumble politics of the
American electoral process so that he may maintain his impartiality and/or
appearance thereof and still protect his' First Amendment rights. Indeed, can
it, in fact, be done? Traditionally, the states have opted to curtail the speech
rights of the candidates under the presumption that each state has a compel-
ling interest in ensuring impartiality.49 The concept of the Announce Clause
originated more than seventy-five years ago when the American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) adopted Canon 30 of the Model Canons of Judicial Ethics.5°
Canon 30 provided that a candidate for judicial office "should not announce
in advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class sup-
port."51 In 1972 the ABA adopted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
52
Canon seven of that code contained the announce clause we deal with
here. 53 In 1990 the ABA amended the 1972 canons to reduce the seven can-
ons to five, and the ABA omitted the Announce Clause.54 In place of the
Announce Clause, the ABA substituted a "commitments clause" that for-
bade a candidate from making statements that "commit or appear to commit
the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to
come before the court." 55 A number of states followed the 1972 code and
incorporated the Announce Clause in their respective codes.56
47. See MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 7 (1857).
48. See Act of June 19, 1912, ch. 2, Minn. Laws, Spec. Sess. 4-6.
49. Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Robe; Judicial Elec-
tions, the First Amendment and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301, 324.
50. LISA L. MILORDS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 140 (1992).
51. Id. at 140 n.3.
52. Id. at 3, 109.
53. See id. at 128 (prohibiting a judicial candidate from "announc[ing] his views on
disputed legal or political issues").
54. Id. at 8, 97-104.
55. Id. at 99.
56. Arkansas incorporated a form of the Announce Clause in its Canon 5, which pre-
vented candidates from announcing their views on "disputed legal or political issues." See
REVISED ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(2)(d) (1993); see also Beshear v.
Butt, 863 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (explaining the adoption and commentary of
the Announce Clause). This provision was struck down in Beshear as being unconstitution-
ally overbroad, vague, and an impermissible restraint on the First Amendment free speech
rights of a judicial candidate. Beshear, 863 F. Supp. at 917-18. The judge in that case had
made a campaign promise that plea bargaining would not be accepted in his court. See id. at
915. By per curiam order in 1996, upon joint petition by the Arkansas Bar Association and
the Association's Special Committee on the Model Code, the Arkansas Supreme Court
struck the offensive language from Canon 5 and substituted the current language that prohib-
its a candidate to "make statements that commit, or appear to commit the candidate with
2003]
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In 1974 the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a code of judicial ethics
designed to assure non-partisan elections and to preclude political activities,
except on measures to improve the law or legal system.57 Contained in the
1974 code, of course, is the ill-starred restrictions on political activities.5 8
Thus Minnesota attempted, as have most of the states, to open the selection
of its judges to the popular choice of the citizens while attempting to pre-
serve the impartiality and appearance of impartiality of a non-partisan judi-
ciary.59 In 1992 the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that, "while the
framers of our state constitution have developed a system of selection and
election quite different from the federal scheme, they too designed a plan to
recognize the uniqueness and independence of the state judiciary." 60 In pro-
viding for the election of judges, the Minnesota Court's adoption of speech
safeguards meant that it believed the election of judges was significantly
different from the election of other public officials. 6' The state felt it had a
compelling interest in having an impartial, independent judiciary, which
was sufficient justification for the curbing of a candidate's First Amend-
ment rights.62
Minnesota is not alone in attempting to structure its judicial elections
so that judges can be selected by the voters without hindering the traditional
role of an impartial judiciary. All states providing for the election of judges
have provided for an array of laws, canons and rules to ensure an impartial
and independent judiciary even though judges are required to periodically
stand for election. In adopting the election process for the judicial branch,
the states have attempted, through experimentation and trial, to balance the
competing interests between an elected judiciary and the First Amend-
63ment. It is this competing interest, or "tension," that Justice Scalia found
64
so disturbing.
The Announce Clause, as written in Canon 5 of the Minnesota Code,
posed a problem for the district court upon being presented Wersal's chal-
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court." REVISED
ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(2)(d) (1993). This language, while not the
same as the part of Canon 5 left alone by the Court in White, is less restrictive than the An-
nounce Clause found invalid in White, because of the key words being "commit or appear to
commit." Id.; see Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002) (distin-
guishing between announcing current views and promising support on a particular issue).
57. See MINN. STAT. ANN. Canon 5 (2003) (historical note).
58. Id. at Canon 5(a)(3)(d).
59. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 975 (D. Minn.
1999) (explaining the historical records and legislative intent of Minnesota's adoption of
judicial elections).
60. Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn. 1992).
61. Id. at 424-25.
62. Id.
63. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 787-88 (2002).
64. Id.
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lenge to the Code's constitutionality. While feeling that Minnesota had a
compelling interest in upholding the impartiality of its elected judiciary, the
district court construed the clause to reach only disputed issues as were
likely to come before the candidate if he were elected judge.65 In doing this,
the court was able to sustain Minnesota's position.66 The Eighth Circuit
adopted the district court's limiting interpretation by holding that the clause
only reached the discussion of issues likely to come before the court.67 The
Minnesota Supreme Court shortly thereafter adopted the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of the Announce Clause.68
III. RESTRICTION OF JUDICIAL CANDIDATES' SPEECH
Traditionally, the courts have held that a state's interest in regulating a
judicial candidate's First Amendment rights stemmed from the difference
between judicial candidates and candidates for other governmental offices. 69
The separation of powers principles embraced in both the Federal and Min-
nesota Constitutions7° require the judiciary to remain independent. Minne-
sota is thus free to enact special rules dealing with speech of the judiciary to
preserve the integrity of that branch. "This sentiment was echoed by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals when it stated that, the principle of impar-
tial justice under law is strong enough to entitle government to restrict the
freedom of speech of participants in the judicial process.",71 The state "may.
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to pro-
mote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further
the articulated interest"; 72 however, "an absolute prohibition on a particular
type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a
compelling governmental interest., 73 The rule has been stated as the strict
scrutiny test: the state has the burden of proving that the restriction (An-
nounce Clause) is both narrowly tailored to and serves a compelling state
65. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (D. Minn. 1999).
66. Id.
67. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2001).
68. In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 639 N.W.2d 55 (Minn. 2002).
69. See, e.g., ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (finding that
"states need not treat candidates for judicial office the same as candidates for other elective
offices"); In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 39-40 (Mich. 2000).
70. U.S. CONST. arts. I-1; MINN. CONST. art. 3, § 1. Under the Minnesota Constitution
the state government is divided into the legislative, executive and judicial branches and
specifies that "[n]o person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the in-
stances expressly provided." MINN. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
71. Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1993).
72. Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
73. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); see also United States v. Playboy
Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
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interest.74 The United States Supreme Court in White held, by a 5-4 vote,
that the Announce Clause of Canon 5 failed both parts of the strict scrutiny
test.
75
In applying the strict scrutiny test, Justice Scalia, writing for the major-
ity, approached the Announce Clause to see if it "unnecessarily circum-
scribed protect[ed] expression., 76 The appellate court had concluded that the
state had established two interests as sufficiently compelling to justify the
Announce Clause: preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and pre-
serving the appearance of impartiality of the state judiciary.77 Justice Scalia
was concerned that no one in either the district court or appellate court, both
of which supported the announce clause, had defined "impartiality. 78 He
reasoned, and rightly so perhaps, that until one knew what it meant, one
could not determine whether impartiality was indeed a compelling state
interest, and if so, whether the Announce Clause was narrowly tailored to
achieve it.79 Justice Scalia then went on to set out the three definitions of
impartiality: (1) the lack of bias for or against eitherparty to the proceeding;
(2) the lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view;
and (3) open-mindedness on issues, which means a willingness to consider
views that oppose one's preconceptions.8 Justice Scalia felt that the first
definition, lack of bias against a party, was the root, or intended definition.8'
Scalia points out that respondents apparently approved this definition, as
evidenced by their briefs advancing the proposition that an impartial judge
82
was essential to due process. Justice Scalia found that the Announce
Clause was not narrowly tailored enough to serve impartiality "inasmuch as
it does not restrict speech . . . against . . . parties, but rather it restricts
speech for or against particular issues."8 3 As worded, a judge would be pro-
74. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989).
75. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-84 (2002). The Announce
Clause is not the only restriction of speech contained in Canon 5. MUNN. STAT. ANN. Canon 5
(2003). It also contains the so-called "pledges and promises" clause which separately prohib-
its a candidate from making "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office." Id. at Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i). This por-
tion of the canon was not challenged by petitioners and the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court expressed no view on it's viability. See generally White, 536 U.S. at 765.
76. White, 536 U.S. at 775 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 776-79.
81. Id. at 776.
82. White, 536 U.S. at 776. Respondents cited Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 531-
34, which held a judge violated due process by sitting on a case in which it would be in his
financial interest to find against one of the parties. See also Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S.
212, 215-16 (1971).
83. White, 536 U.S. at 775-77.
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hibited from taking a stand for or against a legal issue regardless of which
party supported it. Thus, he found, the Announce Clause only barely pro-
motes impartiality.
84
The majority opinion then earnestly begins an attack on the Announce
Clause by finding that it is so "woefully underinclusive" as to render a be-
lief that it supports the object of open-mindedness, a "challenge to the
credulous. 85 Justice Scalia referred to the fact that the clause applies only
to statements made during a campaign. 86 For instance, to use his example, a
candidate for judicial office may not say, "I think it is constitutional for the
legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages. 87 He may say the very same
thing, however, up until the very day before he declares himself a candidate,
and he may say it repeatedly (until litigation is pending) after he is elected.
This "underinclusiveness," according to the majority, destroyed the state's
credibility for its rationale for restricting speech. 88 The opinion then moves
on to discuss, and attempt to refute, the real argument forming the basis for
the Announce Clause and the Court's minority viewpoint: "[T]he notion
that the special context of electioneering justifies an abridgement of the
right to speak out on disputed issues."89 Justice Scalia felt that this argument
"sets our First Amendment jurisprudence on its head." 90 The "underinclu-
siveness" stated earlier cannot be explained, Justice Scalia argues, by resort
to the notion that the First Amendment provides less protection during an
election campaign than at other times. 9' Thus, we have the crux of the ma-
jority's reasoning; judicial elections are really no different than any other
election, for example elections for the legislature, as far as freedom of
speech is concerned.92 The Court further reasoned that speech of judicial
84. Id. at 776. Scalia does recognize that some speech prohibited by the Announce
Clause could well be used against a party as when a candidate states his unbroken string of
convictions for rape. Id. at 777 n.7. Scalia states, "The question under our strict scrutiny test,
however, is not whether the Announce Clause serves this interest at all, but whether it is
narrowly tailored to serve this interest. It is not." Id. (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 780; see also Fla. State Bar v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (stating
that "a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order,' and thus as
justifying a restriction upon truthful speech when it leaves appreciable damage to that sup-
posedly vital interest unprohibited") (citations omitted).
86. White, 536 U.S. at 783.
87. Id. at 779.
88. Id. at 779-80 (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52-53 (1994)).
89. Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 780-84; see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962) (holding that
"[t]he role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they
be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance").
91. White, 536 U.S. at 783.
92. See id.
2003]
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candidates should not be treated differently than speech by judges when
they are not in a political campaign for a judgeship.93
Without doubt, in the normal election process, the right of the candi-
dates to speak out on issues lies at the core of the process of electioneering:
"'[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates' is 'at the core of the electoral
process and of the First Amendment freedoms,' not at the edges., 94 Coin-
ciding with this right to speak is the equally important right of the public to
hear the views of the candidates' so as to more intelligently evaluate the
candidates' individual viewpoints and personalities before choosing among
them on election day: "In a republic where the people are sovereign, the
ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for of-
fice is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably
shape the course that we follow. '95 Mr. Justice Brandeis observed that in
our country "public discussion is a political duty., 9 6 Further, as stated in
Brown, the First Amendment
[E]mbodies our trust in the free exchange of ideas as the means by
which the people are to choose between good ideas and bad, and be-
tween candidates for political office. The State's fear that voters might
make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling
justification for limiting speech. 97
All this is, of course, absolutely correct. The state normally has no
business telling a candidate for office what he can and cannot say or what
he may or may not promise in the heat of a political campaign. But note,
none of the previous paragraph's cited cases dealt with judicial campaigns.
Not one.
IV. AN ELECTION IS AN ELECTION
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, refers to the majority's reasoning as a
unilocular, "an election is an election," approach.98 She and the rest of the
dissenting justices see a judicial campaign as a distinctly different process in
that judges are not political actors because "[t]hey do not sit as representa-
93. Id.
94. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-23
(1989).
95. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
96. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456
U.S. 45, 60 (1882) (stating that "[i]t is simply not the function of government to 'select
which issues are worth discussing or debating' in the course of a political campaign") (quot-
ing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
97. Brown, 456 U.S. at 60.
98. White, 536 U.S. 765, 805 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 26
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tives of particular persons, communities, or parties; they serve no faction or
constituency." 99 It is the business of politicians to commit to sides on con-
tentious issues because such conduct is "at the core of our electoral proc-
ess," 100 for they "enhance the accountability of government officials to the
people whom they represent."' 0' The dissenting justices reasoned that
[E]lected judges, no less than appointed judges, occupy an office of trust
that is fundamentally different from that occupied by policymaking offi-
cials. Although the fact that they must stand for election makes their job
more difficult than that of the tenured judge, that fact does not lessen
their duty to respect essential attributes of the judicial office that have
been embedded in Anglo-American law for centuries.
102
Justice Scalia differs. He maintains that Justice Ginsburg "greatly ex-
aggerates" the difference between judicial and legislative elections:
[The] complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of 'repre-
sentative government' might have some truth in those countries where
judges neither make law themselves nor set aside the laws enacted by
the legislature. It is not true of the American system. Not only do state
court judges possess the power to 'make' common law, but they have
the immense power to shape the [s]tate' constitutions as well.10 3
Thus, the majority of the Court has determined that state court judges
who run for election are, in reality, no different from the legislators of the
states when it comes to their post-election conduct and, thus, the rules for
their election, as far as speech is concerned, should be no different.' °4
The majority draws a distinction between elected judges and those oth-
erwise selected.' 05 Justice Scalia and his supporters do not dispute the im-
portance of judicial impartiality and independence. 10 6 They do, however,
99. Id. at 806 (stating that "it is the business of judges to be indifferent to popularity")
(citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401 n.29 (1991)).
100. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1986).
101. Brown, 456 U.S. at 55.
102. White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 784 (citing Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (1999)).
104. Id. at 787-88. Justice Scalia also feels that even though states are free to do away
with the election of judges, once they provide for them, they have no choice but to open the
process to allow candidates to announce their positions:
The greater power to dispense with elections altogether does not include the
lesser power to conduct elections under conditions of state-imposed voter igno-
rance, If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the
democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process ... the First
Amendment rights that attach to their roles.
Id. (citing Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
105. Id.
106. See id. at 777.
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suggest that once a state makes its choice to elect judges, its interest in judi-
cial independence ceases to be a sufficiently compelling interest to justify
restraints on the candidate's statements on the issues. 10 7 This author submits
that regardless of the manner in which a state selects its judges, the interest
it has in an impartial, independent judiciary is just as overpowering as in
those other states. Due process, that is, a fair trial for all litigants, has never
depended on whether the judge was elected or appointed. The duties of all
judges are the same. 108 In other words, Minnesota does not forfeit its interest
in an impartial and independent judiciary when it decides to elect its judges.
The principles of due process do not change.
V. DUE PROCESS AND RESTRAINT OF SPEECH
Justice Ginsburg hammers the damage done to due process by the
Court's decision:
The impartiality guaranteed to litigants through the Due Process Clause
adheres to a core principle: "[N]o man is permitted to try cases where he
has an interest in the outcome." Our cases have "jealousy guarded" that
basic concept, for it "ensur[es] that no person will be deprived of his in-
terests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case
with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him."' 10 9
The state's interest in guaranteeing due process includes eliminating
not only actual bias but also the appearance of bias. "0 Justice Ginsburg goes
on to point out that "our Due Process Clause cases do not focus on bias
against a particular party, but rather inquire more broadly into whether the
surrounding circumstances and incentives compromise the judge's ability
faithfully to discharge her assigned duties.""'
The Due Process Clause provides litigants the right to unbiased, impar-
tial, open-minded judges, both as a matter of fact and as a matter ofpercep-
tion, but that right must be carefully weighed along with the First Amend-
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that
"[if] a state chooses to select its judges by popular election [it] ... does not signify the aban-
donment of the ideal of an impartial judiciary").
109. White, 536 U.S. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
110. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (finding that
"[t]he Due Process Clause 'may sometimes bar trial by judges who ... would do their very
best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high
function in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."') (citation omitted);
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (ordering the
disqualification of a judge for "destroy(ing) the appearance of impartiality").
11. White, 536 U.S. at 815-16 n.3.
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ment rights presented in this case.'12 Thus, judges who take positions in
advance through public statements on issues likely to come before them on
the bench risk the impartiality that judging demands." 3
VI. THE CAMPAIGN SYNDROME AND THE CROCODILE IN THE BATHTUB
In equating the election of judicial candidates with that of legislators
who are affiliated with political parties, the majority in White makes a fun-
damental mistake. Judges, including elected ones, belong to an institution
that is fundamentally apolitical and that depends, for its very legitimacy, on
remaining at all times scrupulously impartial. Officials in the political
branches of the government are properly elected on the basis of promises to
effectuate policy commitments; therefore, they are expected to take the
opinions of voters into account when making decisions. As Justice Frank-
furter wrote, basic notions of due process and the nature of the role of the
judiciary prevents judges from taking public opinion into account:
[J]udges are restrained in their freedom of expression by historic com-
pulsions resting on no other officials of government. They are so cir-
cumscribed precisely because judges have in their keeping the enforce-
ment of rights and the protection of liberties which, according to the
wisdom of the ages, can only be enforced and protected by observing
such methods and traditions."l
4
Justice Scalia feels judges are not unlike legislators in that judges not
only possess the power to make common law but they, like the legislature,
reshape the constitution as well." 5 This reasoning, however, ignores the
principle of stare decisis, which means that if an issue of law has been pre-
viously decided "there is 'a heavy presumption that settled issues of law
will not be reexamined.""'16 It is therefore the judiciary's role "to interpret
the law, not make it." 117 Thus judges make their decisions based upon a
reasoned examination of the law, and the perception of their independence
is pronounced because they do not decide issues based upon what the public
desires or on campaign promises. Indeed, early on the Court recognized that
112. See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics,
9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 1059 (1996) (exploring the relationship between First Amendment
rights and judicial ethics in judicial elections).
113. See Aetna Life Ins. Co., 475 U.S. at 825.
114. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 283 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
115. See discussion supra Part IV.
116. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Trabucco, 791 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986).
117. See John Wallace, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision ofActivism,
Passivism, and Politics in Casey, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 187, 201 (1994).
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the judiciary's "independence from political forces ... helps promote public
confidence in judicial determinations."'"18
Traditionally, the courts have held that a state's interest in regulating a
judicial candidate's First Amendment rights stemmed from the difference
between judicial candidates and candidates for other governmental of-
fices." 9 Minnesota is thus free to enact special rules dealing with speech of
the judiciary in order to preserve the integrity of that branch. Possibly at the
heart of Justice Scalia's distrust of the Announce Clause, however, is his
opinion that statements made by candidates in judicial campaigns are not
that different from those made at any other time.1 20 In commenting on the
state of Minnesota's argument that the Announce Clause relieves a judge
from the pressure to rule a certain way because of campaign statements on
issues, Justice Scalia states, "[S]tatements in election campaigns are such an
infinitesimal portion of the public commitments to legal positions that
judges (or judges-to-be) undertake, that this object of the prohibition is im-
plausible."''2 1 He thinks that before judges arrive on the bench, or thereafter,
they have often committed themselves to various positions through briefs,
opinions, and speeches. 22 Thus, he states, comments during a campaign are
no different.
23
The majority opinion is totally at odds with the realities of political
campaigns based upon this writer's experience through twenty-two years as
an elected judge, undergoing five campaigns for re-election, three of which
were contested. Statements made during the heat of a campaign, or opinions
or rulings made during that heated period, are light years away from those
made at any other time. Such statements weigh heavily on all office holders
but especially on judicial candidates.
Justice Stevens told the American Bar Association annual meeting in
1996: "It was 'never contemplated that the individual who has to protect our
individual rights would have to consider what decision would produce the
most votes."",124 Echoing this sentiment concerning attacks on judicial im-
partiality, Otto Kraus, a Justice of the California Supreme Court, observed
that adjudicating controversial cases during an election is "like finding a
crocodile in your bathtub when you go in to shave in the morning. You
118. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 n,10 (1982).
119. See, e.g., ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (finding that
"states need not treat candidates for judicial office as candidates for other elective offices");
In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 39-40 (Mich. 2000).
120. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002).
121. Id. at 779.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid
Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 308, 310 (1997) (quoting Florida Supreme Court Justice Ben Overton).
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know it's there, and you try not to think about it, but it's hard to think about
much else while you're shaving."' 125 Any judge who has ever been through
an election understands exactly what those crocodiles look like.126 Justice
Scalia makes light of such pressures during election campaigns (possibly
because he has never run for public office): 127 "But elected judges-
regardless of whether they have announced any views beforehand-always
face the pressure of an electorate who might disagree with their rulings and
therefore vote them off the bench."'' 28 While this is true, the dynamics of an
election campaign-the "rough and tumble" if you will-heighten the effect
of rulings and statements if for no other reason than the electorate is focused
on the candidate and his activities more at this moment than at no other
time. Members of that electorate are looking to the candidate to determine
whether they should vote for him or his opponent. Voters are much more
likely to hear statements made or cases tried during the election period. Dur-
ing the rest of the judge's career, he goes about his business trying cases
with only a bump or two here and there. Most voters would be hard-pressed
to identify any judge in regard to his rulings made day to day. Not many
judges will ever be charged with trying a Timothy McVeigh, to cite the ex-
ample used by Justice Scalia.
129
Barring only the "pledges and promises" part of Canon 5 will lead to a
wholesale assault on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary of
Minnesota and elsewhere. A candidate is now free to express views on is-
sues that will leave little doubt as to how he would rule once the issue
reaches his court. 30 All a candidate has to do now is say "While I cannot
promise anything about how I would rule on the issue, I think all drunken
drivers should be given the maximum sentences under the law." How, if the
candidates were appearing before Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD), would such statements be interpreted by the members of that or-
ganization? How so to the members of the defense bar of that candidates
125. Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of
State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133
(1997).
126. Apparently only one of the current sitting justices has ever endured a judicial cam-
paign, that being Justice O'Connor who served one term as Judge of the Maricopa Superior
Court in Phoenix, Arizona from 1975-1979. See Biographies of Current Members of the
Supreme Court, available at www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last
visited July 1, 2003).
127. See id. (indicating that Justice Scalia was appointed as Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court after having been appointed as a judge to the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit).
128. White, 536 U.S. at 782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 820 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Announce Clause, now
unconstitutional, prevented run-arounds pertaining to statements not technically pledges or
promises).
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jurisdiction? Is there any doubt whatsoever? Only in the realm of the major-
ity in White, it seems, would voters not know how the candidates would rule
in drunken driver cases.13 1 Only the Announce Clause would have pre-
vented this type of end run and protected Minnesota's compelling interest in
upholding the impartiality and independence of its judiciary. Experience has
demonstrated the necessity of the Announce Clause and the insufficiency of
the pledges clause, which on its face does not reach the range of campaign
rhetoric that must be proscribed if the actual and perceived impartiality and
independence of the judiciary is to be protected. The majority opinion offers
no reasonable way to avoid this gutting of the principle of impartiality. 32
Nor would recusal effectively rebut the appearance of impartiality in
these cases. First, there is no guarantee that the judge would recuse if asked.
Recusal is never automatic. Second, it does not serve the state's compelling
interest in having an impartial judiciary to have elected judges with built-in,
publicly expressed bias towards particular issues or parties. Third, to reward
the voters who put a judge in office specifically because of his views creates
pressure on a judge to not recuse. Last, if, in fact, the judge makes the
statements or promises with the hidden agenda of recusing when elected, he
is perpetrating a fraud on the public and the state itself by never intending to
carry through on his announcement. Perhaps most importantly, recusal does
not remedy the loss of public confidence in the judicial system that would
likely result if judicial candidates routinely opined on issues likely to come
before them. This author submits that rather than falling back on recusal, the
states should be permitted to focus on preventing disqualification in the first
instance.
It is interesting that while Justice Scalia professes a "no harm, no foul"
attitude on the Announce Clause, he refused to comment on how he would
rule on a particular case when asked by Senate committee members.' 33 Jus-
tice Scalia stated the following in his confirmation hearing:
Let us assume that I have people arguing before me to do it or not to do
it. I think it is quite a thing to be arguing to somebody whom you know
has made a representation in the course of his confirmation hearings, and
that is, by way of condition to his being confirmed, that he will do this
or do that. I think I would be in a very bad position to adjudicate the
case without being accused on having a less than impartial view of the
matter. 134
131. Id.at780-81.
132. See generally id. at 770-88.
133. Id. at 818-19 n.4. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing to The Nomination of Judge
Antonin Scalia To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 37 (1986)).
134. White, 536 U.S. at 818-19 n.4. It is interesting that Justice Scalia is seemingly refer-
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Other Justices made similar statements. 35 Indeed, Justice Kennedy,
who appears in his concurring opinion to hold that no restriction whatso-
ever, not even that of pledges, should be allowed in an election campaign 
36
recognized the damage to the image of the judiciary by positioning oneself
on an issue. 137 Justice Scalia counters this potential embarrassment by as-
serting that "the practice of voluntarily demurring does not establish the
legitimacy of legal compulsion to demur."' 38 Nevertheless, even Justice
Scalia understands that a judge announcing his viewpoint on an issue likely
to come before him does not further the appearance of impartiality. 3 9
VII. POST WHITE
Justice Scalia has sounded the trumpet and the walls of judicial speech
restraint have fallen. As a result of White, it will now be a simple matter for
a candidate to telegraph, not so subtlety, his or her views on any legal issue
likely to come before him or her once elected. Judging by past conduct, we
can expect that a candidate will not have to be particularly inventive to find
ways around the pledge clause still left standing by White.' 40 Judging by the
comments of Justice Kennedy, even the pledge clause is far from safe.'
4 1
Woe unto the state judiciary if this comes to pass. Pity the poor honest, ethi-
cal judge who is running for reelection and is opposed by a ruthless aggres-
sive attorney who wants to be elected at any cost. The judge will not be able
to stand by in silence as his opponent promises any and everything to the
electors in order to win votes. If anyone seriously doubts such a spectacle, I
can only point to the legislative and executive campaigns of the past. The
ring to the issue of appearance of impartiality as to issues rather than parties. See his refer-
ence as to the "root" definition of impartiality discussed earlier herein. See discussion infra,
Part III (discussing Justice Scalia's reference as to the "root" definition of impartiality).
135. White, 536 U.S. at 804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136. Justice Kennedy states: "The state may not regulate the content of candidate speech
merely because the speakers are candidates." Id. at 794. "What Minnesota may not do, how-
ever, is censor what the people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which candi-
date is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer. Deciding the relevance of candidate
speech is the right of the voters, not the State." Id.
137. "1 think if a judge decides a case because he or she is committed to a result, it de-
stroys confidence in the legal system." Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 144 (1987) (statement of Anthony M. Kennedy, Supreme Court nominee).
138. White, 536 U.S at 783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
139. See discussion supra Part I11.
140. White, 536 U.S. at 783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 792-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg correctly described Justice
Kennedy's holding as stating that "no content-based restriction of a judicial candidates
speech is permitted under the First Amendment .... While he does not say so explicitly, this
extreme position would preclude even Minnesota's prohibition against 'pledges and prom-
ises' by a candidate for judicial office." Id. at 802 n.4.
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actual and perceived impartiality and independence of the judiciary will be
totally and irretrievably lost.
At least one case has already expanded on White, further removing re-
strictions on judges speech.142 In Spargo, the United States District Court in
Utica, New York 43 widened the door opened by White and held that the
state had no compelling interest in restricting a judge from actively engag-
ing in political activities.144 On May 8, 2003 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit temporarily stayed the district court's order
pending oral argument before that body. Whatever the outcome of that case,
the handwriting is on the wall. The opening salvos of the "Mother of All
Wars" have been sounded and judicial impartiality and independence are in
full retreat.
Should more weight be given to the due process rights of the litigant
than to the free speech rights of the candidate? Which is more important?
Do the speech rights of one judge reign paramount over the due process
rights of all the citizens who will appear before him? When faced with this
test question, the majority in White sadly failed, and the judiciary and the
public's trust in same will suffer severe, perhaps fatal, damage.
142. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y.
2003).
143. Id. at 88 (rejecting the argument that this case was distinguishable from White, the
judge stated that in White the speech at issue was judicial candidates announcing views on
issues; whereas, the political conduct here in a campaign is at issue).
144. Id. at 80-81 (stating that Judge Spargo allegedly engaged in the prohibited conduct
by giving the keynote address at a Conservative Party dinner and that he worked for the Bush
Campaign in Florida while serving as a judge).
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